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The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial
Insemination by Donors
I. INTRODUCTION
Human procreation can be accomplished through a variety of reproductive tech-
nologies that do not involve sexual intercourse. Among these artificial techniques
are surrogate motherhood,1 in which a woman is artificially inseminated 2 with a
man's sperm, bears his child, and gives the child to the man and his wife to be
raised as their child;3 in vitro fertilization, in which the egg and sperm are united in
a culture dish, where the egg is fertilized and the resulting embryo implanted in the
woman's uterus;4 and embryo or ovum transfer, in which an egg is fertilized in a
donor and transferred to a prospective mother's womb. 5
By far the most commonly used artificial reproductive technique has been
artificial insemination by donor (AID), 6 in which sperm from a donor is used to
inseminate a woman who is not the donor's wife.7 Artificial insemination (Al) with
1. For information about surrogate reproduction, see Eisenman, Fathers, Biological and Anonymous, and Other
Legal Strangers: Determination of Parentage and Artificial Insemination by Donor Under Ohio Law, 45 Oo ST. L.J.
383, 393-96 (1984); Griffin, Womb For Rent, 9 STunEsrr LAw. 29 (Apr. 1981); Comment, Artificial Insemination and the
Low, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 935, 950-52 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Al and the Law]; Comment, Parenthood by
Proxy: Legal Implications of Surrogate Birth, 67 IowA L. Rev. 385 (1982); N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1984, at D29, col. 4;
Friedrich, A Legal, Moral, Social Nightmare, Time, Sept. 10, 1984, at 54; Wallis, A Surrogate's Story, Time, Sept. 10,
1984, at 53; Wallis, The New Origins of Life, Time, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46; Jenkins, Fertility Rights, TWA Ambassador,
Jan. 1985, at 60 (approximately 300 surrogate births have occurred in the United States).
2. Artificial insemination is "the introduction of semen into the vagina or cervix by artificial means," Dou.eO 's
ILLUs. M . Dicr. 669 (26th ed. 1981). A typical statutory definition is the "introduction of semen into a woman's vagina,
cervical canal or uterus through the use of instruments or other artificial means." OR. Rev. STAT. § 677.355 (1983).
3. Eisenman, supra note 1, at 393.
4. ENcY. OF Binonocs 1448-49 (1978). See also Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction
Technologies, 70 A.B.A. J. 50 (Aug. 1984); Clapshaw, Legal Aspects of Artificial Human Reproduction: Can the Law
Afford to Play Ostrich?, 4 Auca.AN U. L. REv. 254, 262-69 (1982); Davies, Close Encounters in a Test Tube, 1983 NEw
L.J. 107; Edwards, Steptoce & Purdy, Establishing Full-Term Human Pregnancies Using Cleaving Embryos Grown In
Vitro, 87 Bert. J. OBs. & GYN. 737 (Sept. 1980); Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for
Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973, 975-76 (1982); Soupart, Current Status ofIn Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in Man,
23 Cu4. Oas. & GYN. 683 (Sept. 1980); Comment, Protecting Inheritance Rights of Children Born Through In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Suggestions for a Legislative Approach, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 901, 925-28 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Protecting Inheritance Rights]; Comment, Love's Labor Lost: Legal and Ethical
Implications in Artificial Human Procreation, 58 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 459 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Love's
Labor Lost]; N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1984, at D29, col. 4; Friedrich, supra note 1, at 54; Wallis, The New Origins of Life,
Time, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46. There have been approximately 100 in vitro or "test tube" births in this country. Jenkins,
supra note 1, at 60.
5. Soupart, supra note 4. For discussions about ovum transfer, see generally Andrews, supra note 4, at 50-53;
Lorin, supra note 4, at 973, 975-76; Comment, Protecting Inheritance Rights, supra note 4, at 901-02; Comment, New
Reproductive Technologies: The Legal Problem and a Solution, 49 Tem. L. REv. 303, 325-28 (1982); N.Y. Times, Feb.
4, 1984, at 6, col. 1; Schmeck, Jr., "PrenaralAdoption" Is the Objective of New Techniques, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1983,
at Cl, col. 4. There have been two births by embryo transfer in the United States, the first in 1984. Jenkins, supra note
I, at 60.
6. Jenkins, supra note 1. For statistics, see infra text accompanying notes 11-14.
7. W. Fneoow, Armeicm. INseuNAnoN 3 (1964); Beck, A Critical Look at the Legal, Ethical, and Technical
Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 27 Femri & Sseesrv I (Jan. 1976). See also Comment, Protecting Inheritance
Rights, supra note 4, at 901 n.3. The other forms of artificial insemination (Al) include artificial insemination by husband
(AIH) and confused artificial insemination (CAI), in which the husband's and donor's sperm are commingled before the
wife is inseminated. Potential medical complications have resulted in the current disuse of CAI. Quinlivan & Sullivan,
Spermatozoal Antibodies in Human Seminal Plasma as a Cause of Failed Artifcial Donor Insemination, 28 Fe-nLrsy &
STrurry 1082, 1082-85 (Oct. 1977).
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the husband's sperm (AIH) is also performed, 8 but will not be discussed here as it
presents few legal problems. Artificial insemination by a donor frequently is used
when the husband produces no sperm, has few motile sperm, a genetic defect, a
family history of insanity, or an Rh incompatability with his wife that could cause
stillbirths.9
The first use of human AI in the United States was recorded in 1866.10 Before
1941, AI resulted in approximately 10,000 births in the United States;'1 between 1941
and 1963 approximately 1,000 to 1,200 children were conceived each year by this
method.' 2 Today, it is estimated that 6,000 to 20,000 AID births occur each year.'3
Statistics on AID vary greatly because many doctors who perform AID either do not
keep records of their work or protect their records with extreme secrecy to protect the
donor's anonymity. 14 In one survey, only thirty percent of responding doctors said
they keep records of the identity of the donors.15 Despite the lack of accurate records
In each of the AI methods, the doctor uses a syringe to inject the husband's or donor's sperm into the wife's reproductive
system. See, e.g., Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly Kept Secret, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 777, 781
(1970).
8. Verkauf, Artificial Insemination: Progress, Polemics, and Confnision-An Appraisal of Current Medico-Legal
Status, 3 Hous. L. REv. 277, 302 (1966); Comment, Artificial Insemination and the Law, supra note 1, at 936. AIH may
be employed for a variety of psychological and physical reasons, including the following: the man's sperm count is low,
see J. McCusmnc, BAsic ANATO.MY AND PursloLoY or nmE Hus AN BODY 519, 521 (1975); the man is impotent, see McCunrc
at 521, the man has an organic defect with his penis, see Dori.AND's ILLus. MED. Dicr. 643 ("hypospadias") (26th ed.
1981), the cervical secretions are hostile to the sperm, see W. FnoLD, ARnac.AL INsemAIoN 17 (1964), or physical
conditions in the woman hinder the proper migration of the sperm, see Comment, Al and the Law, supra note I, at 936.
See also Wadlington, supra note 7, at 782.
9. Weisman, The Medical Viewpoint, 7 SiArcusE L. REv. 96, 97 (1955). See also Comment, Aland theLaw supra
note 1, at 937.
10. Comment, Al and the Law, supra note 1, at 938. Dr. 3. Marion Sims inseminated six women with their
husbands' sperm; one became pregnant. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. See also Andrews, supra note 4; Annas, FathersAnonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor,
14 FAm. L.Q. 1 (1980); Griffin, supra note 1; Wadlington, supra note 7, at 785.
14. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States,
300 NEw ENG. 1. Me. 585 (Mar. 1979). See also Stone, Complications and Pitfalls of Artificial Insemination, 23 Cur.
Oss. & GYN. 667 (Sept. 1980); Annas, supra note 13, at 10; Eisenman, supra note 1, at 386 n.25, 391; Wadlington, supra
note 7, at 785 n.35.
Accurate statistics on the number of doctors performing AID, or the number of births through AID, are unavailable.
None of the following organizations collected such statistics or knew of any other statistical compilations: American
Association of Tissue Banks, American Bar Foundation, American College of Obstetrics & Gynecology, American
Fertility Society, American Medical Association, Ohio Section of the American College of Obstetrics & Gynecology, and
the Ohio State Medical Association. Dr. J.K. Sherman, Prof. of Anatomy, Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, completed
a survey in May 1984 which showed that over 24,000 children worldwide had been conceived by the use of AID with
frozen sperm. He stated that this is a very conservative estimate, since it includes statistics only from doctors responding
to the survey. Frozen sperm have been used in AID since 1955 but have been used frequently only in the past five years.
Generalizations as to the percentage of AID children conceived with the use of frozen as opposed to fresh sperm cannot
be made because records are rarely kept. Thus, no extrapolation to the number of children conceived with fresh donor
sperm can be drawn from this survey. Telephone interview with Dr. J.K. Sherman, Prof. of Anatomy, Univ. of Ark. for
Med. Sciences (Feb. 27, 1985).
15. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 585. See also Annas, supra note 13, at 10; Eisenman, supra
note 1, at 391.
The doctors the author contacted all kept coded records of the donor's identity; the doctor alone could identify a
donor. Most of the doctors stated that they would not reveal the donor's identity, even in a courtroom. Telephone
interviews with: Dr. James Goldfarb, Repro. Endocrin., Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 4, 1985); Dr. Leonard Levine, Urologist,
Fargo, N.D. (Feb. 28, 1985); Dr. Grant Schmidt, Asst. Prof. Obs. & Gyn., Ohio St. Univ. (Jan. 29, 1985); Dr. Frederick
Schweizer, Repro. Endocrin., Columbus, Ohio (Jan. 30, 1985); and Dr. J.K. Sherman, Prof. of Anatomy, Univ. of Ark.
for Med. Sciences (Feb. 27, 1985). Some doctors use double-blind procedures so that even the doctors do not know which
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about donors, authorities agree that approximately ten to twenty percent 16 of mar-
ried 17 couples in the United States are infertile.
Because the use of artificial insemination by donor is widespread in the
United States, the legal system needs to respond to the problems that can affect
AID-conceived children, sperm donors, doctors, and intended parents (those who
use donor insemination to conceive). This Note will examine the few AID
cases that have been heard in this country and current statutes that regulate
this procedure. It will then analyze Ohio's current paternity law,' 8 and several of
the problems' 9 that could occur using this procedure in Ohio or in any state
that lacks an AID statute. 20 This Note will then look at House Bill 147
(HB 147),21 a legislative attempt to add a provision for artificial insemination by
donor to Ohio's paternity law. Finally, it will present ideas for drafting an AID
statute, and will discuss the need for such laws. This Note will not examine the
following topics, which are too comprehensive to be addressed here: religious as-
pects of artificial insemination by a donor;. father's rights;23 donor insemination as
patient is inseminated with a particular donor's sperm. Telephone interview with Dr. Leonard Levine, Urologist, Fargo,
N.D. (Feb. 28, 1985). According to one source, the need for donor anonymity is critical. In response to a new law in
Sweden which gives children the right to learn who their biological parents are, it was anticipated that the use of AID
would "come to a virtual stop in Sweden." Kids Must Know Fathers, Columbus Dispatch, Mar. 3, 1985, at 4D, col. 1.
16. See Griffin, supra note 1, at 29; Comment, NewReproductive Technologies: The Legal Problem and a Solution,
supra note 5, at 311; Wallis, supra note 1, at 46, 50; Jenkins, supra note 1, at 60. See also Policy Analysis Panel of
Commission on Interprof. Educ. and Prac., Report of Interprofessional Policy Analysis Panel on Alternative Modes of
Reproduction, Section I: Model Statute Regarding Artificial Insemination, Preamble at 1 (Nov. 8, 1984) (available at
Office of Commission on Interprof. Educ. and Prac., The Ohio St. Univ. College of Educ.) [hereinafter cited as Model
Statute].
17. This Article will discuss only AID and married persons. For discussions of AID and single persons, see
generally C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977) (known donor of sperm to
single woman entitled to visitation rights); Kern and Ridolfi, The Fourteenth Amendment's Protection of a Woman's Right
to Be a Single Parent Through Artificial Insemination by Donor, 7 WomN's Rrs. L. Rpm. 251 (1982) (methods of AID
available to single women); Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for an
Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARv. Wo.N's L.J. 1 (1981); Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J.
FAs. L. 331, 344-46 (1979-1980). See also Comment, A[ and the Law, supra note 1, at 953 n.77; Model Statute, supra
note 16, Commentary to Statute at 2. The statistics on infertility for married couples are similar to those for single persons.
Andrews, supra note 4, at 50 ("[w]ith infertility on the rise. . . now affecting one in six people"); Model Statute, supra
note 16, Preamble at I ("15%-20% of the reproductive age-group population"). Only the AID statute in Oregon
specifically deals with single women and AID. OR. Ray. STAT. § 677.365(1) (1983), see infra note 102.
18. Omo Rav. CoDE ANN. 88 3111.01-.19 (Page Supp. 1984).
19. Since the purpose of this Article is to present a suggested legislative approach to procedures for artificial
insemination by donor, the discussion of problems will be used only to demonstrate why statutes are necessary. For a list
of the numerous law journal articles discussing the problems associated with donor insemination, see infra note 137.
20. States that lack AID laws may declare a child to be illegitimate. A child barn within lawful wedlock and
presumed to be the genetic offspring of the husband and wife was given the status of legitimacy. 10 AM. Jti. 2d Bastard
§ 10-18 (1981). At common law, an illegitimate child had no legal parents; id. § 8, but "[t]he common law of
illegitimacy is unusually unsuited to modem conditions." Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A
Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 Tvx. L. REv. 829, 831 (1966). For general discussions of the history of the
concept of illegitimacy, see Venezia, The Rights of an Illegitimate Child Post-Gomez v. Perez: A Legitimate Situation?,
12 ST. MARY's L.J. 199 (1980); Verkauf, supra note 8, at 302-05; Comment, Protecting Inheritance Rights, supra note
4, at 903, 913-21.
21. House Bill 147, 115th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1983) [hereinafter referred to as HB 147].
22. For discussions of the religious debates regarding AID, see generally Annas, supra note 13, 4-5; Fullerton,
Artificial Insemination, 2 F . L. Rav. 31, 32-33 (1979); Rice, AID-An Heir of Controversy, 34 Noar DA LAw. 510,
525-28 (1959); Verkauf, supra note 8, at 277-78, 289-90; Wadlington, supra note 7, at 785 n.37; Comment, Love's
Labor Lost, supra note 4, at 460-64; 4 Ecy. oF Biomics 1444, 1460-62 (1978).
23. The following cases focus on the father's rights and artificial insemination by donor C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J.
Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977); People ex rel. Abajian v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184
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adultery;24 sperm banks and the Rule Against Perpetuities;25 and conflict of laws
problems. 26
II. AID CASES DECIDED IN THE UNITED STATES
Fewer than one dozen cases regarding artificial insemination by donor have been
heard in this country.27 These cases have led to differing and confusing conclusions,
demonstrating the need for new statutes to guide the courts when dealing with
artificial insemination, a procedure not contemplated when paternity laws were
written.
Hoch v. Hoch,28 decided in 1945, was the first American case to mention ar-
tificial insemination. Alleging adultery, a husband sought divorce on the grounds
that his wife was pregnant when he returned from World War 11.29 The wife
claimed to have been artificially inseminated with a donor's sperm. Based on testi-
mony that the wife had numerous male friends, the court awarded the husband his
divorce. 30 The court did mention that it would not deem artificial insemination to
be adultery.
Strnad v. Strnad,3 1 decided three years after Hoch, dealt with the husband's
visitation rights to a child conceived, during the marriage and with the husband's
consent, by artificial insemination. Upon separation, the wife sued to determine
her husband's rights to the child. In an unusual decision, the court held that "the
child has been potentially adopted or semi-adopted.''32 No reasoning was offered
for this proposition. In dicta, again without explanation, the court noted that, if the
husband consented to the procedure, the effect of artificial insemination is not
illegitimacy. 33
Another visitation rights case, Ohison v. Ohlson,34 was decided in 1954. In
OhIson, artificial insemination by donor was admittedly performed, but the perform-
N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (husband granted visitation rights); Strnad v. Stmad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390
(Sup. Ct. 1948) (husband granted visitation rights to child created by AID with husband's consent).
24. The implications of AID as adultery have been discussed in Shaman, supra note 17, at 333-34; Comment, Al
and the Law, supra note 1, at 956-66.
25. For discussions about sperm banks and the Rule Against Perpetuities, see generally Fullerton, supra note 22,
at 32; Sappideen, Life After Death-Sperm Banks, Wills and Perpetuities, 53 Ausm. L.J. 311 (1979); Comment, Love's
Labor Lost, supra note 4, at 469, 470 n.80.
26. A comprehensive discussion of AID and conflict of laws problems occurs in Ehrenzweig, The "'Bastard" in
the Conflict of Laws-A National Disgrace, 29 U. CI. L. REv. 498 (1962); see also Krause, supra note 20, at 830-31.
27. These cases illustrate that present case law and statutes are insufficient to protect the parties involved in the
insemination procedure. For discussions of AID cases and statutes in other countries, see generally Clapshaw, supra note
4, at 254; Wadlington, supra note 7, at 786-87; Comment, AI and the Law, supra note 1, at 939-44; Comment, Love's
Labor Lost, supra note 4, at 464-66.
28. No. 44-C-8307 (Unreported, Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1945); see "Wife Tells Veteran of 'Test Tube' Baby;
He Wins Divorce," Chicago Sun, Feb. 10, 1945, at 13, col. 3.
29. Chicago Sun, supra note 28.
30. Id.
31. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
32. Id. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391. For a rejection of this result by another New York court, see Gursky v. Gursky,
39 Misc. 3d 1083, 1087, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410-11 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
33. 190 Misc. 786, 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
34. No. 53-S-1410 (Sup. Ct. Cook County, III. Nov. 1954); see also Medicolegal Aspects of Artificial Insemi-
nation: A Current Appraisal, 157 J. AN. MED. A. 1638, 1639 (Apr. 1955) [hereinafter cited as Medicolegal Aspects].
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ing doctor could not conclusively state that the husband had not fathered the child.35
The court therefore found that the evidence did not outweigh the presumption of
legitimacy since the child was born in wedlock.3 6 The court issued no specific
statements about the medical procedure used.37
In Doornbos v. Doornbos,38 a husband had consented to his wife's artificial
insemination by donor but failed to adopt the resultant child in a legal proceeding. The
wife sought a divorce and a declaratory judgment that the husband was not in fact the
child's father and had no right to the child.3 9 The court granted the declaratory
judgment regarding the husband's visitation rights, but disagreed with the wife's
contention that the insemination was not adulterous. 40 The only clue to the court's
reasoning is the statement that artificial insemination by donor, "with or without the
consent of [the] husband, is contrary to public policy and good morals, and constitutes
adultery on the part of the mother. A child so conceived is not a child born in wedlock
and [is] therefore illegitimate.' '41
The next divorce and visitation rights case was People ex rel. Abajian v.
Dennett,42 in which a wife claimed that her husband was not the childrens' father
because they were created by artificial insemination. In a New York court, the
husband won continuance of the visitation rights he had obtained in a divorce decree
in Nevada, where the wife lived with the children after separating from her husband.
The court decided that the wife's previous conduct, including granting the husband
rights in the divorce decree, demonstrated a recognition of her husband's rights to the
children. Therefore, she was estopped from asserting that he was not the childrens'
father.43
Gursky v. Gursky44 was also decided on estoppel grounds. The husband had
consented in writing to his wife's receiving donor sperm, had agreed to pay the costs
of the procedure, and was listed as the child's father on the birth certificate.45
Nonetheless, when he sought a separation and was counter-sued for annulment, the
husband claimed that he was not the child's father.46 The court ruled that because the
husband consented to the insemination, he was estopped from claiming a lack of
liability for the child's support. Ironically, the court also decided that the child was
illegitimate: 47
The State Legislature has exercised its power to modify the concept of illegitimacy in
certain respects.... The fact that it has not chosen to deal with the question of legitimacy
35. Medicolegal Aspecis, supra note 34, at 1639.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. No. 54-S-14981 (Ill. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 1954) (summarized in 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Jan. 4, 1955)), appeal
dismissed, 12 I11. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956) (not published in full) (dismissed on procedural grounds).
39. 12 I11. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
40. Id.
41. 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Jan. 4, 1955).
42. 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
43. Id.
44. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
45. Id. at 1084-85, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
46. Id. at 1084, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
47. Id. at 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
1985] 1059
1060 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:1055
as it relates to children begotten and born through heterologous artificial insemination
[AID] must be deemed to manifest a disinclination to modify... a concept which must
logically result only in a determination adverse to the legitimacy of a child begotten by a
father other than the husband of the mother.48
Thus, the court refused to legislate or reinterpret New York's existing statutes.49
The country's next AID case was Anonymous v. Anonymous.50 On facts quite
similar to those in Gursky, the husband was held liable for support, despite the child's
illegitimacy, and the child was found illegitimate, despite the husband's consent to
AID. 51
The first AID case to be decided by a state's highest court, People v. Sorensen,52
occurred in California in 1968. Having obtained her husband's written consent, a
woman had been artificially inseminated, and she bore a child.53 When the couple
divorced, the wife declined support payments; when she became ill and began
receiving public support, the district attorney sued the husband for support. 54 The
court held the husband liable for support, finding that the intent of the state's support
statute led to a determination that he was the lawful father 5 According to the court,
this result would prevent the "obvious injustice that would result were a child
artificially conceived excluded from the protection of a law intended to benefit all
minors, legitimate or illegitimate." 56 Further, the court noted that the "public policy
of this state favors legitimation." 57 Unlike the New York court in Gursky, the
California Supreme Court stated, "In the absence of legislation prohibiting artificial
insemination, the offspring of defendant's valid marriage to the child's mother was
lawfully begotten and was not the product of an illicit or adulterous relationship."Ss
In re Adoption of Anonymous,59 decided in 1973, presented a unique issue
among cases dealing with this procedure. The husband had consented in writing to his
wife's artificial insemination, and was listed on the child's birth certificate as the
child's father.6° After the parents' divorce, the husband supported and visited the
child. 6' When his wife remarried and her second husband attempted to adopt the
child, the first husband refused to consent.62 The wife argued in court that her first
husband was not the parent of the child since he was not its biological father. The New
York court rejected this argument63 and held that "a child born of consensual AID
during a valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and privileges of a
48. Id. at 1087, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
49. Id. at 1086, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
50. 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
51. Id. at 888, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 836-37.
52. 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
53. Id. at 282, 437 P.2d at 497, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 285, 437 P.2d at 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
56. Id. at 288, 437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 289, 437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
59. 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
60. Id. at 101, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See supra text accompanying note 47. Id. at 104, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
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naturally conceived child of the same marriage.' -64 In part, the court's reasoning was
based on the notion that "[i]t serves no purpose whatsoever to stigmatize the AID
child; or to compel the parents formally to adopt" in light of the state's liberal statute
that conferred legitimacy upon children born of void or voidable marriages. 65
The next case to be decided in the United States, C.M. v. C.C.,66 involved an
unique issue concerning the visitation rights of an unwed father-donor to the child he
helped create with an unmarried female. The couple, who intended to marry,
successfully performed artificial insemination by themselves when a doctor refused to
inseminate the woman. 67 Six months before the AID-conceived child was born, the
couple ended their relationship. 68 After the child's birth the donor-father sued for
visitation rights. Because C.M. was willing to assume the responsibilities of a father,
the court allowed him to do so, citing law which favors a child's having both a father
and a mother. 69 However, using common law principles, 70 the court also held that the
child was illegitimate, as its parents had never married. 7'
The most recent case to consider artificial insemination by donor, K.S. v.G.S.,
addressed the issue of a husband's consent to his wife's use of the procedure. 72 In this
divorce case, the husband, attempting to avoid liability for the support of an
AID-conceived child, stipulated that he verbally consented to his wife's first series of
insemination attempts, 73 but that he later told his wife "to stop the AID treatments
because of the cost" 74 after the first successful insemination resulted in a miscarriage.
The court declared the defendant to be the child's lawful father for several reasons. 75
The court disbelieved the defendant's testimony that he withdrew his consent to
further insemination attempts, and it believed the wife's testimony that her husband
had accompanied her to the doctor's office on several occasions after the supposed
withdrawal of his consent. 76 The court also noted that:
Public policy considerations seeking to prevent children born as a result of AID
procedures from becoming public charges or being bastardized require that a presumption
of consent exist and that a strong burden be placed on one seeking to rebut the
presumption.... [Clonsent of the husband .... once given, is presumed to be effective
at the time when pregnancy occurs, unless the husband establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that such consent has been revoked or rescinded. Defendant has not met that
burden.77
64. Id. at 105, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435-36.
65. Id. at 105, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
66. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977).
67. Id. at 161, 377 A.2d at 821-22.
68. Id. at 161, 377 A.2d at 822.
69. Id. at 163, 377 A.2d at 825.
70. See supra note 20.
71. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 161, 377 A.2d 821, 822 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977).
72. 182 N.J. Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64 (super. Ct. 1981).
73. Id. at 104, 440 A.2d at 65.
74. Id. at 105, 440 A.2d at 66.
75. Id. at 110, 440 A.2d at 68.
76. Id. at 105, 440 A.2d at 66.
77. Id. at 109, 440 A.2d at 68.
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The defendant was required to provide some financial support for the child, and was
granted visitation rights if he wished to exercise them. 78
In conclusion, even the most recent cases to consider this procedure do not
establish conclusively that AID-conceived children born of married parents are free
of the stigma of illegitimacy, nor do courts comprehensively address the issues of the
rights and duties of donors or prospective parents. The statutes that do exist to regulate
artificial insemination describe the child's status more uniformly but are grossly
inadequate regarding other legal implications of the practice.
III. AID STATUTEs IN THE UNITED STATES
Since 1964, twenty-eight states have passed statutes regarding artificial
insemination by donor.79 Nine states8° enacted statutes modeled after the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' Model Uniform Parentage
Act (UPA). 8' The UPA was designed to establish that the rights of illegitimate82
and legitimate children should be equal, 83 and is largely directed toward "the iden-
tification of the person against whom these rights may be asserted. 84 The Act de-
fines the parent and child relationship, 85 states that the relationship applies regard-
less of the parents' marital status, 86 and offers rebuttable presumptions of parent-
age. 8 7 The Act also outlines standing requirements88 and procedures explaining how
a parentage suit may be brought. 89 Recognizing the need for some legislation re-
garding artificial insemination by donor, 90 the commissioners also included a skele-
78. Id. at 110, 440 A.2d at 69.
79. ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (Supp. 1985); ALAsKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. Are. § 61-141
(1971); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983); CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1978); Co.NN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-69f to
-69n (1981); FLA. STAT. Arm. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANrs. § 19-7-21 (1982); IDo CODE §§ 39-5401
to -5407 (1985); Ia.. Ar. STAT. ch. 40 §§ 1451-1453 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. Ar. §§ 23-128 to -130
(1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1985); MD. EST. & TRusTs CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974); MD. HEATH-
GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-214 (1982); Mica. Co'. LAws ANN. §§ 333.2824,700.111 (West 1980); MwNs. STAT. ANN. § 257.56
(West 1982); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1983); NEv. Rsv. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West
Supp. 1985); N.Y. Dom. RE. LAw § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEa. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); Oa.. STAT. ANN. tit. 10
§ 551-53 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109.247, 677.355-.70 (1983); TEN. CODE ANN. §
53-446 (Supp. 1982); TEx. F^m. CODE ANN. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE § 64.1-7.1 (1980); WNsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 26.26.050 (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.47(9) (West 1981) and 891.40 (West Supp. 1985); W'yo. STAT.
§ 14-2-103 (1978).
Only two states are currently considering legislation concerning AID. Ohio's proposed statute will be discussed in
this Article. Rep. Richard Fitzpatrick, from Michigan's 49th District, introduced House Bill 4114 to Michigan's
legislature in 1983. The Bill died in the House in December 1984. The Bill, which would pertain to all reproductive
techniques, would sanction whatever reasonable contracts the involved parties create. The Bill will be reintroduced soon.
Telephone interview with Richard Fitzpatrick, Rep., Mich. Legis., 49th Dist. (Feb. 27, 1985).
80. California, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Washington, and Wyoming.
81. Uw. PARENrAGE Acr (1979), 9A U.L.A. 579 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UPA].
82. See supra note 20.
83. UPA, 9A U.L.A. 581 (Commissioners' Prefatory Note) (1979).
84. Id.
85. UPA § 1, 9A U.L.A. 587 (1979).
86. UPA § 2, 9A U.L.A. 588 (1979).
87. UPA § 3-4, 9A U.L.A. 589-91 (1979).
88. UPA § 6, 9A U.L.A. 593 (1979).
89. UPA §§ 6-24, 9A U.L.A. 593-616 (1979).
90. UPA § 5, 9A U.L.A. 593 (Commissioners' Comment) (1979).
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tal AID section9' and urged state legislators to give consideration to other legal as-
pects of the procedure.92
The nine states which adopted the section regarding artificial insemination did
not make substantial additions to the UPA. 93 The Act establishes that if a husband and
wife consent in writing to have the wife artificially inseminated by a donor, and the
insemination is performed by a licensed doctor, the "husband is treated in law as if
he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived. ' 94 The consent form is to be
filed with the state department of health and kept in a sealed file. Although the
doctor's failure to file the form does not affect the parent and child relationship,
neither does it result in sanctions. 95 Finally, the Act states that a man who donates
sperm for the artificial insemination of a married woman, other than the donor's wife,
is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived. 96
Statutes dealing with artificial insemination in the other nineteen states vary
greatly. The provision most common to the statutes is that the husband and wife must
both consent in writing to insemination in order for the statute to apply. 97 Fourteen
states require the consent form to be filed with the state department of health,
department of vital statistics, or a local court,98 and two states permit the consent form
to be filed in the doctor's office. 99 Although ten of the nineteen non-UPA statutes
require a licensed doctor to perform the insemination for the statute to apply,"10 only
three states give any protection to doctors administering the procedure. 10 1 All the
91. UPA § 5, 9A U.L.A. 593 (1979).
92. UPA § 5, 9A U.L.A. 593 (Commissioners' Comment) (1979).
93. For example, California, Colorado, Washington, and Wyoming have declared that the donor is not the child's
natural father, regardless of whether the donee is married or single. These provisions do not provide substantially greater
protection than the UPA. See text accompanying note 94. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983); Cow. Rav. STAT.
§ 19-6-106 (1978); WASH. REa. CoDE ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1978).
94. UPA § 5, 9A U.L.A. 592 (1979). For the purposes of this Article, it is assumed that these are natural
expectations of the parties when they contemplate the procedure. The desires of the parties may change, as when the donor
seeks visitation rights. However, these rights should be fixed prior to the insemination, not by legal proceedings after the
birth of the child.
95. Id.
96. UPA § 5, 9A U.L.A. 593 (1979).
97. It is interesting that although written consent is required, there are no sanctions if the consent form is not filed
with any authority. See supra text accompanying note 95.
Only six states, Arkansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Tennessee, and Texas, do not require written consent
from both the husband and wife. Of these, all but Louisiana require that the husband alone consent. Louisiana has a unique
statute which declares that a husband who has consented to his wife's insemination cannot disavow his paternity. Consent
is not defined, and no cases have been decided under this provision. LA. Civ. CoDE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1985).
98. ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (Supp. 1984); Cow. Ray. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1978); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69h (1981);
IDAHo CODE § 39-5403 (1985); KANSAs STAT. ANx. § 23-130 (1981); Mm. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 1982); MoNT. CoDE
ANN. § 40-6-106 (1983); NEv. REv. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1985); O.A. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10 § 553 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REv. STAT. § 677.365(2) (1983); WAsH. Ray. CoDE ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp.
1985); Wis. STAT. Ann. § 767.47(9) (West 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1978). In Colorado, Minnesota, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, Washington, and Wyoming the statute is part of the state's UPA.
99. CAL. Civ. CoD § 7005 (West Supp. 1983); IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 1453 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). For privacy
concerns explaining why records should be kept in doctors' offices, see infra note 187.
100. ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (Supp. 1985); ALAKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Supp. 1983); CowN. Gus. STAT. §§ 45-69f to
-69n (1981); GA. CoDE ANN. § 43-34-42(a) (1984); IDAno CooE § 39-5402 (1985); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney
1977); OmLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 553 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.360 (1983); VA. CoDE § 64.1-7.1 (1980);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1985). All of the UPA-styled AID statutes require a licensed doctor to perform
the procedure for the statute to apply.
101. A. A. CoDE § 26-17-21 (Supp. 1985); GA. ConE ANN. § 43-34-42(b) (1984); MD. HsTH-GEN. CoDE ANN.
§ 20-214 (1982).
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statutes, except Oregon's, 102 state or imply that the law applies only to married
women. In general, the statutes state either that the husband is the natural father of
the child, 103 or that the child is the legitimate' 0 4 or natural' 05 child of the husband who
consented to his wife's insemination. In only two states is this presumption irrebut-
table. 106 Eleven statutes specifically provide that the donor is not the natural father of
the child. 107
Unfortunately, most existing AID statutes do not regulate the donor's medical
condition, nor do they stipulate that donors do not have any rights or duties to the
child. Only Idaho, 08 New Jersey, 109 and Washington" o restrict the donor's respon-
sibilities and rights, and only Idaho"' and Oregon" 2 require donors to meet certain
medical standards in order to donate sperm.
Current statutes, both in states which have passed the UPA and in those which
have not, are skeletal in nature and offer inadequate protection to the parties involved
in the artificial insemination procedure'3-donors, prospective parents, children,
and doctors. Yet they do offer statutory confirmation that AID-conceived children
should be treated as natural children of the consenting couple. Further, they offer a
framework for legislatures to build on as problems arise and amendments become
necessary.
In states that have not adopted a statute regulating artificial insemination by
donor, parties must still approach these questions in a judicial forum, with scattered,
limited, and inconsistent cases to guide them.1"' Worse yet, three states, including
Ohio, have passed a version of the UPA without adopting a provision concerning
102. OR. REv. STAT. § 677.365(1) (1983). Oregon's statute says Al should not be performed without the woman's
prior written consent, "and, if she is married, the prior written request and consent of her husband." Id.
103. ALA. CoDE § 26-17-21 (Supp. 1985); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 19-6-106
(1978); lu.. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 1453(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Mc, Co.p. LAws ANN. § 333.2824 (West 1980);
Min. STAT. Ar. § 257.56 (West 1982); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1983); NEv. Rsv. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); N.J.
STAT. Arm. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. Arm. § 767.47(9) (West 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West
Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1978).
104. ARK. STAT. Arm. § 61-141 (1971); FLA. STAT. Arm. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21
(1982); MD. EsT. & TRUSTs CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974); MrcH. Comp. LAws Arm. § 333.2824(6) (West 1980); TrmZ. CODs
Arm. § 53-446 (Supp. 1982); TEx. FrAr. CODE Arm. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975).
105. A.Ass. STAT. § 25.20.045 (Supp. 1983); Com. GE. STAT. § 45-69i (1981); IDAHO CooE § 39-5405(3) (1985);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 1452 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. Arm. § 23-129 (1981); N.Y. Do.Ni. RE.. LAw § 73
(MeKinney 1977); N.C. GE. STAT. § 49A-I (1984); ORI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 552 (Vest Supp. 1985); VA. CODE
§§ 64.1-7.1 (1980).
106. FLA. STAT. Arm. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CooE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1982).
107. AiA. CODE § 26-17-21 (Supp. 1985); CAL. Civ. CooE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983); CoLO. Rsv. STAT. § 19-6-106
(1978); Iu. Ar. STAT. ch. 40 § 1453(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Mim. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 1982); Mo.r. CooE
ANN. § 40-6-106 (1983); NEv. REv. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); N.J. STAT. Arm. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1985); TEx. Fk..
CooE Am. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ArN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1983-1984); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103
(1978).
108. IDAHO CODE § 39-5405(1) (1985).
109. N.J. STAT. Arm. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1985).
110. WASn. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(2) (Supp. 1985).
111. ImAO CODE § 39-5404 (Supp. 1985).
112. Os. Rav. STAT. § 677.370 (1983), which provides that "no semen shall be donated for use in artificial
insemination by any person who: (1) Has any disease or defect known by him to be transmitted by genes; or (2) Knows
or has reason to know he has a veneral disease."
113. See, e.g., Comment, Protecting Inheritance Rights, supra note 4, at 914-15, 921. See also infra notes 137-65
and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 28-71 and accompanying text.
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artificial insemination.11 5 The presumptions, '1 6 standing requirements, and eviden-
tiary methods appropriate in a parentage suit under these statutes, when applied to
AID situations, lead to results contrary to the parties' expectations and to good public
policy. This Article will discuss Ohio's Uniform Parentage Act (OPA) in the context
of artificial insemination by a donor and will demonstrate the need for change in North
Dakota's and Hawaii's laws, as well as in the laws of all states lacking an AID statute.
It will then describe Ohio's House Bill 147117 which proposes to add a provision
concerning artificial insemination to Ohio law. Finally, the issues that a model statute
should address in order to protect all the parties potentially affected by the procedure
will be identified.
IV. OHO'S UNIFORM PARENTAGE Acr-ANALYsIs AND POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS
The OPA' 18 was passed by Ohio's General Assembly on March 3, 1982, and
became law on June 29, 1982.119 According to Helen Fix, the legislator who
introduced the OPA into the General Assembly, the purpose of the OPA was to update
Ohio's paternity laws to make it easier to identify fathers.' 2 0 Before the OPA was
passed, genetic or blood tests could be admitted into evidence in a paternity suit only
to disprove paternity. 12' The OPA changed this aspect of parentage law122 and also
offered a new definition of the parent-child relationship.123 Contrary to the idea of
parentage based upon the concept of legitimacy, as determined by the woman's
marital status, 24 the OPA determines parentage based upon biological or adoptive
relationships.'5 The parent and child relationship "extends equally to all children and
all parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents."'126 That relationship is the
115. HAwAn REv. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1976); N.D. CENT. CoDE §§ 14-17-01 to -26 (1981); Omo Rsv. CODE ANN.
§§ 3111.01-.19 (Page Supp. 1984).
116. See infra text accompanying notes 128-36 for the presumptions in Ohio's statute.
117. iB 147, supra note 21.
118. OPA, supra note 18.
119. Am. Sub. H.B. 245, reprinted in 1982 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-47 (Baldwin). No legislative history is available
in Ohio; thus, interviews were used to determine how the OPA was introduced in Ohio. Telephone interview with Helen
Fix, State Employment Relations Board member, former Representative to the Ohio General Assembly (Feb. 4, 1985).
Helen Fix introduced Am. Sub. H.B. 245 on the urging of the Cincinnati Bar Association. The Bar wanted genetic tests
to be admissible in paternity suits to prove and disprove paternity. See infra, note 121. This use of genetic tests would
allow the state to attempt to identify those responsible for a child's support, thereby decreasing the number of women on
welfare rolls.
Ms. Fix and a Cincinnati member of the Ohio Bar Association drafted an act regarding the use of genetic tests. In Ohio,
such drafts are presented to a Legislative Service Commission (LSC), which then drafts its own suggested legislation. The
LSC recommended that Ms. Fix look at the UPA to see if she wanted the bill to address more issues than just the use of
tests. Once in the General Assembly, the final draft of the bill was further amended due to the concerns of the Ohio Bar
Association, Fathers for Equal Justice, and County Commissioners. Telephone interview with Helen Fix, Ohio State
Employment Relations Board member (Feb. 4, 1985).
120. See supra note 119.
121. Omio REv. Coon ANN. § 3111.16 (repealed 1982).
122. Otno REv. CooE ANN. §§ 3111.09-.10 (Page Supp. 1984).
123. Otuo REv. Coos ANs. § 3111.01 (Page Supp. 1984).
124. Owo REv. Coos ANN. § 3111.01 (repealed 1982). See Walker v. Stokes, 54 Ohio App. 2d 119, 375 N.E.2d
1258 (1977); Eisenman, supra note 1, at 384-87; Frankart, The Determination of Parentage Under the New Ohio
Parentage Act, 55 Onto B.A. REP. 1248 (1982).
125. Owo Rsv. CooE ANN. § 3111.01 (Page Supp. 1984).
126. Onto REv. CooE ANN. § 3111.01(B) (Page Supp. 1984).
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"legal relationship that exists between a child and the child's natural or adoptive
parents and upon which this chapter and any other provision of the Revised Code
confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations." 127
Prior to the passage of the OPA, Ohio law recognized a strong presumption that
a child born during a marriage was the child of the husband. 128 Under the present law,
however, a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child under any of the
following circumstances:
(1) The man and the child's mother are or have been married to each other, and the
child is born during the marriage or is born within three hundred days after the marriage
is terminated ....
(2) The man and the child's mother attempted, before the child's birth, to marry each
other.. . , [and] the marriage is or could be declared invalid ....
(3) The man and the child's mother, after the child's birth, married or attempted to
marry each other... and any of the following occur:
(a) The man has acknowledged his paternity...
(b) The man, with his consent, is named as the child's father on the child's birth
certificate;
(c) The man is required to support the child ....
(4) The man, with his consent, signs the birth certificate.129
When the OPA's new definition of the parent-child relationship is read in conjunction
with the provisions regarding the presumptions about the natural father, a sperm donor
could be found to be the child's father. 130 While the UPA avoids this problem by
including a section which protects donors, 131 the OPA was introduced without a
provision concerning artificial insemination by donor.132 No amendment to the OPA
has filled this void.
In addition, while these provisions still lead to a presumption that the husband
is the natural father, they are rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.133 In a section 3111.04 paternity suit, 134 the following evidence of paternity
is admissible under section 3111.10:
(A) Evidence of sexual intercourse between the mother and alleged father at any
possible time of conception;
(B) An expert's opinion concerning the statistical probability of the alleged father's
paternity, which opinion is based upon the duration of the mother's pregnancy;
127. OHio REv. CoD ANN. § 3111.01(A) (Page Supp. 1984).
128. OHIo RPv. CoDE ANN. § 3111.16 (repealed 1982); Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370, 1372 (6th Cir. 1973).
129. OHIo Rv. COD ANN. § 3111.03(A) (Page Supp. 1984).
130. OHIo REv. CoD ANN. § 3111.03 (Page Supp. 1984). See also Model Statute, supra note 16, Commentary to
Statute at1.
131. UPA § 5, 9A U.L.A. 593 (1979).
132. Telephone interview with Helen Fix, Ohio State Employment Relations Board member (Feb. 4, 1985). Ms. Fix
stated that there was no intent to omit the AID provision. Since her initial interest was with the introduction of genetic
testing as evidence of paternity, a section dealing with artificial insemination was not included. Because the Bill was
amended numerous times, she was surprised that this oversight was never corrected.
133. Onao REv. CoD ANN. § 3111.03(B) (Page Supp. 1984).
134. OHio Rv. CODE ANN § 3111.04 (Page Supp. 1984).
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(C) Genetic test results, weighted in accordance with evidence, if available, of the
statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity;
(D) Medical evidence relating to the alleged father's paternity of the child based on
tests performed by experts....
(E) All other evidence relevant to the issue of paternity of the child.' 35
When combined, the presumptions of paternity and admissions of evidence of
paternity can lead to legal dilemmas for a donor when protective AID statutes are
nonexistent. 136
A. Potential Problems for Donors 37
Suppose that a married woman received artificial insemination by a donor
without her husband's consent. Should the husband decide to bring a paternity
action, 138 he could gain access to his wife's medical records since the OPA does not
require them to be sealed. 139 Section 3111.10(E), quoted above, allows all relevant
evidence to be admitted in the paternity action.140 Thus, assuming such evidence
exists, the identity of the donor is subject to discovery. Once the donor is brought into
court, it may, upon its own or a party's motion, order the mother, alleged fathers, and
child to undergo genetic testing. 14 1 The availability of a variety of increasingly
sophisticated genetic tests makes it possible to determine biological parentage with a
high degree of accuracy, usually over ninety percent.14 2
135. Ojuo REv. CODE ANN § 3111.10 (Page Supp. 1984).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
137. The great number of problems that could affect sperm donors, prospective parents, children, and doctors have
been exhaustively discussed in a number of law journal articles. This Article will discuss only the problems that can occur
under the OPA, in order to demonstrate why an AID statute is necessary. For further examples of support, visitation,
inheritance, and malpractice problems likely to occur when AID statutes are lacking, see Annas, supra note 13 (problems
of all); Andrews, supra note 4, at 52-53, 56 (problems for parent and child); Biskind, Legitimacy of Children Born by
Artificial Insemination, 5 J. FAm. L. 39 (1965) (problems of child); Clapshaw, supra note 4, at 256-62, 269-72 (problems
for parents and child); Davies, supra note 4 (problems of all); Fullerton, supra note 22 (problems of all); Knoppers, The
"Legirimization" ofArtificial Insemination: Promise or Problem?, 1 FAm.,. L. REv. 108 (1978) (problems of all); Shaman,
supra note 17, at 333-50 (problems of all); Smith, Great Expectations or Convoluted Realities: Artificial Insemination
in Flux, 3 FA.t. L. REv. 37 (1980) (problems for doctors and donors); Verkauf, supra note 8, at 297-308 (problems of
all); Comment, Al and the Law, supra note I, at 956-79 (problems for parents and child); Comment, Artificial
Insemination-Upon Whom Shall the Duty to Support Rest?, 17 DE PAUL . REv. 575 (1968) (problems of child).
138. Owo REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.04 (Page Supp. 1984) allows a man alleged to be the child's father to bring a
paternity action. This Article will not discuss maternity suits since these occur in the surrogate parent situation. The OPA
establishes a presumption of maternity, Oteo Rev. COoE ANN. § 3111.02 (Page Supp. 1984), which can be rebutted, as
could the presumption of paternity discussed in the text. Section 3111.17 makes all sections of the OPA applicable to
maternity actions. Owo REv. CODE Arm. § 3111.17 (Page Supp. 1984).
139. Oino REv. CODE Ar. § 3111.07 (Page Supp. 1984) (alleged father is proper party to action). Of course, the
records may not reveal who the donor is. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
140. Owo REv. CoE ANN. § 3111.10(E) (Page Supp. 1984).
141. Oino Rev. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.08-.09 (Page Supp. 1984).
142. Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases not Excluded by A8O Testing, 16 J. FAm. L. 543
(1977-1978). The "simplest and least expensive test for exclusion of paternity" is the ABO red cell test. Id. at 554.
Unfortunately, this test effectively excludes only approximately 10% of putative parents. Id. at 555. The Human
Leukocyte Antigens (HLA) test, id. at 545, in use since the early 1970s, id. at 544, is at the opposite extreme. The test
allows an accurate determination of a child's genotype, id. at 545, which is composed of one haplotype from each parent;
combined with an analysis of the known parent's genotype, the genotype of the other biological parent can be determined
by a process of elimination. Id. at 545-46. Since each haplotype is almost unique, one or a series of HLA tests can lead
to an accuracy rate greater than 90%, and as high as over 99% in some cases. Id. at 552. See also Forrest, The Legal
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Sophisticated genetic testing thus affords the evidence necessary to determine
that the sperm donor is the biological parent of the child. In the hypothetical situation
of a married woman conceiving artificially without her husband's consent, the
husband could use genetic testing to rebut the presumption that he is the child's
father. 43 A court faced with this evidence would be forced either to ignore the
evidence and declare the child to be the husband's, or declare that the biological father
is the man responsible for all duties to his natural child. The latter decision would be
contrary to the wishes of the mother and the donor.
Even if the wife and donor had created a written agreement regarding parentage,
this contract would not bar a suit under section 3111.04.144 The only way to protect
the donor is with a provision, similar to Florida'45 and Georgia146 statutes, stating that
an AID-produced child is irrebuttably presumed to be legitimate if husband and wife
consented in writing to the procedure.147
Unprotected by a statute concerning artificial insemination, the donor in Ohio
also faces the same scenario if the donee-wife's husband dies while the child is
younger than twenty-three years of age 48 and the donee-wife decides to sue the
donor. Since the statute of limitations under the OPA extends until the child attains
the age of twenty-three, 49 it is possible that a consenting donee would decide to sue
the donor for child support. No cases have yet been heard on these facts, or on most
fact situations involving artificial insemination by donor, 50 so there is no judicial
statement about the problem.
In addition, the child conceived by artificial insemination may attempt to sue the
donor for support. In Ohio, section 3111.04(A) affords the child the right to bring a
paternity action.'15 The child might decide to sue if his or her mother's husband had
not consented to the procedure and would not support the child, if the husband died,
or if the child was seeking a portion of the donor's estate. 152
Implications of HLA Testing for Paternity, 16 J. F.Am. L. 537, 540 (1977-1978). As one authority on HLA tests noted,
"I[t]he HLA system of tissue types is so powerful in determining the probability of paternity that many of the older rules
of evidence for blood tests in disputed paternity cases now require complete revision." Terasaki, supra, at 543. As the
Ohio Supreme Court noted in Owens v. Bell, 6 Ohio St. 3d 46, 451 N.E.2d 241 (1983), in recent years the HLA tests
have been legally recognized as evidence regarding the probability ofpaterity. See also Willerick v. Hanshalli, 136 Mich.
App. 484 (1984).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 135-42.
144. Oiuo Ray. CODE ANN. § 3111.04(B) (Page Supp. 1984).
145. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (Vest Supp. 1985).
146. GA. CooE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1982).
147. The other AID statutes merely establish a rebuttable presumption that the child is legitimate.
148. Owo Ra,. COoE ANN. § 3111.05 (Page Supp. 1984).
149. Id.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 28-78 for the limited issues decided in AID cases.
151. Onto Rav. CODE Ars. § 3111.04(A) (Page Supp. 1984).
152. The statute of limitation for bringing the paternity action is explicitly preempted by the limitation for bringing
suit against a decedent's estate. Onto Rv. CoDE ANN. § 3111.05 (Page Supp. 1984); outside Ohio, see, e.g., Mo,rr. COoE
ANN. § 40-6-108(4) (1983); NEv. Rav. STAT. § 126.081(2) (1979). This time limit is often six months after the filing of
the estate's closing statement. UNIF. PROEATE CoDE § 3-1005, 8 U.L.A. 405 (1983).
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B. Potential Problems for AID-Conceived Children and Their Consenting Parents
Just as the donor may face unexpected problems due to his sperm donation, the
AID-produced child and his or her parents can also find themselves placed in complex
and sensitive situations due to the lack of a relevant statute establishing the child's and
parents' rights. Through a paternity action, a donor could attempt to obtain access to
the insemination records, if any, since they are "relevant to the issue of paternity of
the child." 153 The donor could then sue the child's supposed parents for visitation
rights, causing great confusion to the child. While this may sound unlikely, a similar
situation has occurred in New Jersey in C.M. v. C. C 54
The child is also susceptible to a judicial declaration that the child has no father,
since its biological father is not married to its mother and the man married to its mother
is not the child's natural father.' 55 Should the court so decide, the child could be
prevented from inheriting from the husband or its biological mother. Were the wife
inseminated without her husband's consent, there is some chance that the wife's other
children could keep the AID-conceived child from inheriting a share of the estate left
to their father's children.' 56
C. Potential Problems for Doctors
Just as donors, children, and parents face potential difficulties when statutes
concerning artificial insemination by donor are lacking, doctors are potentially liable
because of the lack of protective provisions. Only Alabama, 157 Georgia, 58 and
Maryland 59 specifically protect doctors. Alabama's statute states that the supervising
physician shall not incur liability due to the AID procedure.' 60 Georgia's statute
provides that if a doctor performs AID with the written consent of both husband and
wife, the doctor is not civilly liable to the husband, wife, or child, unless he or she
was negligent.' 6' Maryland protects the doctor only from civil or disciplinary liability
for refusing to perform, participate in, or make referrals regarding this procedure. 62
In any other state, it is possible for the child to sue the doctor for allowing a genetic
disorder to be transmitted to the child.' 63 The child's parents could also sue the
153. Ouio REv. CooE ANN. § 3111.10(E) (Page Supp. 1984). The physician-patient privilege could prevent this
problem, except in cases such as C.M. v. C.C., see supra text accompanying notes 66-71, or when the woman's medical
chart is filed separately from insemination records.
154. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977) (case discussed at text accompanying notes
66-71, supra); but see In re Connolly, 43 Ohio App. 2d 38, 332 N.E.2d 376 (1974) (visitation rights denied to biological
father of child conceived in an extramarital affair when the mother subsequently married a man who assumed the role of
father). See also Model Statute, supra note 16, Commentary to Statute at 1 (Under Ohio law, a donor theoretically could
ask a court to declare him the natural father with the rights accompanying that status.).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 28-78.
156. See supra note 20.
157. A A. Coos § 26-17-21 (Supp. 1985).
158. GA. CD AmN. § 43-34-42(b) (1984).
159. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CoD ANN. § 20-214 (1982).
160. ALA. Coos § 26-17-21 (Supp. 1985).
161. GA. CDs ANm. § 43-34-42(b) (1984).
162. MD. HEALTH-GN. Cons ANN. § 20-214 (1982).
163. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980); see generally
Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 Cwu. L. Rav. 618 (1979).
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doctor. 164 Even if the consent form signed by the parents released the doctor from
liability, it is unlikely that the courts would respect this agreement. Although consent
forms for artificial insemination by donors have not yet been tested in the courts,
similar forms have been declared ineffective in cases holding that persons cannot
avoid their negligence by contract. 165
While the aforementioned problem scenarios confronting donors, children,
parents, and doctors present just a few of the many difficulties that can occur under
the OPA,166 they serve to demonstrate the need for a comprehensive statute to prevent
problems that can arise from conflicting interpretations of artificial insemination cases
and statutes.
The passage of the OPA without a provision regarding artificial insemination by
donor has directly affected the practice of insemination in Columbus, Ohio. One
doctor said that while approximately forty percent of local obstetricians used to
perform artificial inseminations, this number decreased to approximately five percent
following passage of the OPA.167 Another local doctor, who formerly performed
approximately 150 insemination procedures per month, is currently involved in only
approximately five such procedures a month, because of doctors' and donors' fears
of liability. He claims that there is "absolutely no question at all" that this decrease
is due to the passage of the OPA. 168 Thus, change in the law is needed now. In Ohio,
House Bill 147169 has been offered as an amendment to section 3111.03 of the
OPA, t70 and would put a skeletal AID provision in the law.
164. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (parents sued doctor
for "wrongful life" for alleged negligence in failing to inform prospective parents properly of risks of pregnancy, thus
affecting their decision to continue with pregnancy; parents could recover for cost of long-term institutional care for
mentally retarded child that otherwise might have been aborted); see also Smith, supra note 137, at 38-42; Jenkins, supra
note 1, at 62 (husband claimed defective sperm used).
165. See Shaman, supra note 17, at 348 (courts reluctant to allow people to contract away their negligence). See,
e.g., Annot., 6 A.L.R. 3d 704 (1966).
166. See supra note 128.
167. Telephone interview with Dr. Grant Schmidt, Asst. Prof. Obs. & Gyn., Ohio State Univ. (Jan. 29, 1985).
168. Telephone interview with Dr. Frederick Schweizer, Repro. Endocrin., Columbus, Ohio (Jan. 30, 1985). He
now obtains sperm from out-of-state donors rather than local donors, at twice the cost of using fresh sperm. Id. Drs.
Schweizer and Schmidt of Columbus believe their use of AID has been affected adversely because they tell donors about
the gaps in Ohio law. Telephone interviews with Dr. Grant Schmidt, Asst. Prof. of Obs. & Gyn., Ohio State Univ. (Jan.
29, 1985); Dr. Frederick Schweizer, Repro. Endocrin., Columbus, Ohio (Jan. 30, 1985). Outside Columbus, doctors have
not seen a decrease in AID use or participation by donors since the passage of the OPA. Telephone interview with Dr.
James Goldfarb, Repro. Endocrin., Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 4, 1985). The author could not locate any doctors in Hawaii
or North Dakota, the other UPA states without AID provisions, who had noticed a decrease in the use of AID since the
passage of their state's UPA. A possible inference is that the decrease in the number of donors in Columbus, Ohio is due
to the amount of information that the Columbus doctors tell prospective donors.
Some doctors recognize the benefits that an AID statute can provide. Telephone interviews with Dr. Leonard Levine,
Urologist, Fargo, N.D. (Feb. 28, 1985); Dr. Grant Schmidt, Asst. Prof. Obs. & Gyn., Ohio State Univ. (Jan. 29, 1985);
Dr. Frederick Schweizer, Repro. Endocrin., Columbus, Ohio (Jan. 30, 1985). Others believe that the AID system works
fine now, and that legal involvement would only cause problems. Telephone interviews with Dr. James Goldfarb, Repro.
Endocrin., Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 4, 1985); Dr. J.K. Sherman, Prof. of Anatomy, Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences (Feb.
27, 1985).
169. HB 147, supra note 21.
170. Oalo Ray. CODE ANN. § 3111.03 (Page Supp. 1984).
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V. HousE BILL 147
House Bill 147 (HB 147)171 was introduced into Ohio's General Assem-
bly on February 10, 1983.172 After the House Committee on Civil and Com-
mercial Law considered the bill, it was passed by the House with a unanimous
vote.173 The Bill was sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee, where it simply
died.' 74 The Bill was reintroduced as House Bill 476 on April 18, 1985.175 House
Bill 476 is being considered in hearings by the House Judiciary and Criminal
Justice Committee, which will be asked to accept Substitute House Bill 476 for
consideration when the General Assembly reconvenes. 176 Due to the uncertain
171. See supra note 21. There is no legislative history available on this Bill. The LSC Bill analyses merely reiterate
the provisions of the Bill without explanation. See Ohio Legis. Serv. Commission, 115th Gen. Ass., Bill Analysis, HB
147 (as introduced); Bill Analysis, HB 147 (as reported by House Civil and Commercial Law Committee).
172. Telephone interview with General Assembly librarian (Jan. 18, 1985).
173. Id.
174. Id. Rep. Marie Tansey, the representative who introduced the Bill, states that although it met with no strong
opposition, political problems led to inaction. No legislative history is available on the Senate Committee's discussions.
Telephone interview with Rep. Marie Tansey, Ohio Gen. Assem. (Jan. 18, 1985).
175. House Bill 476, 116th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1985) [hereinafter cited as HB 476].
176. Telephone interview with Rep. Marie Tansey, Ohio Gen. Assem. (Aug. 2, 1985). In HB 476, the provisions
regarding AID are found in sections 3111.30 to 3111.38, and are more detailed than those offered in HB 147. HB 476,
supra note 175. The Bill contains definitions of the terms "artificial insemination" and "physician." Id. § 3111.30(A)-(B).
Section 3111.31 states that sections 3111.30 through 3111.38 do not apply to "surrogate motherhood or artificial
insemination of women who are not married." HB 476, § 3111.31. Section 3111.32 of the Bill would require that all AID
procedures be performed by a physician or a person under the control and supervision of a doctor. HB 476, § 3111.32.
House Bill 476 also provides that fresh semen may be used for AID only if the doctor who will accept the semen for
donation has received a complete medical history of the donor within one year of the donation and has given the donor
a physical examination. HB 476, § 3111.33(B). The donor must also be tested for blood type and RH factor immediately
before the semen donation. The Bill would allow the use of frozen semen for AID if additional tests are performed on the
semen. HB 476, § 3111.33(C).
The Bill also details the information which must be provided on the written consent form signed by both prospective
parents before using the AID procedure. BB 476, § 3111.35(A). Included on this form would be provisions requiring
anonymity between donors and prospective parents, "a statement that the wife and the husband understand that the
physician cannot be responsible for the physical or mental characteristics of any child resulting from the artificial
insemination," and "a statement that there is no guarantee that the wife will become pregnant." § 3111.35(A). The form
would also contain particular information about the donor, if available to the doctor, such as the donor's medical history,
race, eye color, and age. § 3111.35(A). House Bill 476 would permit the physician to reveal other information to
prospective parents who request it, such as the donor's religious background, talents, and educational ability, and
"information . . . that the donor has informed the physician may be disclosed to the wife and the husband." HB 476,
§ 3111.35(B). Section 3111.36 establishes recordkeeping requirements and provides that the written consent form,
information about the donor, and AID records would be retained in the physician's office, filed separately from the wife's
regular medical chart, and that the file would not be a public record. HB 476, § 3111.36(A). This section would also
establish who could view the files and for what reasons. HB 476, § 3111.36(B). Information that the donor did not make
available to prospective parents would be kept for five years, and would be revealed only upon court order, after the court
determined that specific facts would be necessary or helpful in a child's medical treatment. HB 476, § 3111.36(C).
Section 3111.37 of HB 476 would establish an irrebuttable presumption that the child conceived as a result of AID
is the natural child of the husband who consented to the use of the procedure, and that the donor would not be treated as
the natural father of a child conceived with his semen. HB 476, § 3111.37. Section 3111.38 would provide that a
physician's failure to comply with any of the requirements of sections 3111.30 through 3111.37 would "not affect the
legal status, rights, or obligations of a child . . . .a wife . . . .a husband who consented . . . . or the man who was
the donor." HB 476, § 3111.38.
Substitute House Bill 476, to be offered to the House Judiciary and Criminal Justice Committee when the Ohio
General Assembly reconvenes, would amend HB 476 by adding definitions of "donor," "non-spousal artificial
insemination," and "recipient" to the Bill. Telephone interview with Rep. Marie Tansey, Ohio Gen. Assem. (Aug. 2,
1985). This Bill substantially changes HB 476 in that section 3111.31 would no longer state that sections 3111.30 through
3111.38 do not apply to "artificial insemination of women who are not married." HB 476, § 3111.31. The sponsor of
HB 476 opposed this change which would provide legal protection for single women who use AID and for their resulting
children. Telephone interview with Rep. Marie Tansey, Ohio Gen. Assem. (Aug. 2, 1985). At a meeting regarding the
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status of the amended bills, this Note will concentrate on the provisions of House
Bill 147.
HB 147 is quite similar to section 5 of the UPA. 177 The Bill proposes to "amend
section 3111.03 and to enact section 3111.031 of the Revised Code to specify that a
husband who consents to the artificial insemination of his wife by another man shall
be regarded as the natural father of the conceived child." 178 The Bill retains section
3111.03 of the OPA, relating to presumption of paternity,1 79 as is, except to add the
statement that "a conclusive presumption as described in section 3111.031 of the
Revised Code cannot be rebutted." 18 0
Section 3111.031, which has no present counterpart in Ohio, would be Ohio's
artificial insemination by donor provision. 181 It provides that if a husband and wife
consent in writing to have the wife artificially inseminated with a donor's sperm, and
the procedure is performed by a licensed doctor, "the husband shall be treated in law
and regarded as the natural father of the child so conceived and that the child shall be
treated in law and regarded as the natural child of the husband." 182 The conclusive
presumption established under section 3111.03 will not be affected by any suit
brought under sections 3111.01 to 3111.19 when this procedure is involved, 183
thereby precluding the aforementioned problems. 184 This provision represents a move
in the proper direction, assuring rights to the child and conclusively determining a
consenting husband's duties.
House Bill 147 purports to protect the child further by providing that the doctor
who supervised the procedure should certify the husband's and wife's signatures, and
file the consent form with the Department of Health.18 5 The doctor's failure to comply
with this part of the Bill would not affect the legal relationship between father and
child. 186 Also, while a child may want to learn whether he was created by artificial
insemination, the Bill would not place a penalty upon doctors not keeping this
information on record.
Despite the lack of penalties, some doctors oppose filing consent forms with a
government body. Some see it as an invasion of the privacy of the doctor and his
patients, 187 or as a likely way for information to be given out when it should not
Bill, a local doctor, an American Medical Association representative, an attorney, and a staff employee of Ohio's
Legislative Services Commission asked Ms. Tansey to include this change in Substitute House Bill 476. Interview with
Rep. Tansey.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
178. HB 147, supra note 21.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 128-36.
180. BB 147, supra note 21, § 3111.03(B).
181. RB 147, supra note 21, § 3111.031.
182. HB 147, supra note 21, § 3111.031(A).
183. HB 147, supra note 21, § 3111.03(B).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 137-65.
185. RB 147, supra note 21, § 3111.031(B).
186. Id. The failure to file appears to have no effect on any of the participants involved, since the Bill would impose
no sanctions.
187. Rubin, Year-Old Law Threatens to Bring Insemination into Light of Courtroom, Columbus Citizen-Joumal,
June 28, 1983, at 6, col. 1; telephone interview with Dr. Frederick Schweizer, Repro. Endocrin., Columbus, Ohio (Jan.
30, 1985). Dr. Schweizer, one of only five reproductive endocrinologists in the Columbus, Ohio area, performs various
artificial reproductive techniques, including AID, in his private practice. Dr. Schweizer believes so strongly in the privacy
of AID that he keeps coded lists of his donors. Should a genetically defective baby ever be born to one of his AID patients,
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be. 188 Further, doctors in the field appear to feel that the child should not be given
access to such information, and they assert that very few, if any, AID-conceived
children are even told of how they were conceived. 189
Nevertheless, the Bill does provide for some non-public' 90 filing with the state.
It explicitly limits those persons who may inspect or copy consent forms or doctor's
records to the husband, wife, supervising doctor, or custodian of the records, unless
a court issues a conflicting order for good cause shown. 19 1 On public policy
grounds 192 the court could prevent the sperm donor from being identified. Even if the
court were to release the donor's name, he would still be protected by the irrebuttable
presumption of section 3111.031 (A) that the wife's husband who has consented to this
procedure is the natural father of the child thereby conceived. 193 At the same time,
adopted children could still get information regarding their natural parents, including
genetic information, upon a showing of good cause. 194 Finally, the Bill offers
protection to the sperm donor whose sperm is used to inseminate a married woman.195
It states that he "shall not be treated in law or regarded as the natural father of the
child so conceived and that child shall not be treated in law or regarded as the natural
child of that man.' 1 96
However, if artificial insemination is used without a husband's consent or
without a licensed doctor's supervision, or if his sperm is used to inseminate an
unmarried woman, the donor possibly could still be charged with legal responsibility
for the child. These omissions result from legislative reluctance to address certain
controversial issues.197 A basic statute will at least protect donors when doctors and
donors are careful to work within the law.
While the five provisions of HB 147198 all serve useful purposes, a much broader
statute should be passed by the Ohio legislature. Many important issues are not
he can trace the donor through his code and discontinue using that donor's sperm. Dr. Schweizer indicates that this practice
is not uncommon among AID-performing doctors. Interview with Dr. Schweizer; telephone interview with Dr. James
Goldfarb, Repro. Endocrin., Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 4, 1985). Dr. Goldfarb is one of six reproductive endocrinologists
in Cleveland, Ohio. Like Dr. Schweizer, he is opposed to reporting requirements, but sees little problem if compliance
is not mandatory. Interview with Dr. Goldfarb.
188. Telephone interview with Dr. Goldfarb, Repro. Endocrin., Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 4, 1985).
189. Id.; telephone interview with Dr. Frederick Schweizer, Repro. Endocrin., Columbus, Ohio (Jan. 30, 1985) (he
estimated that "99.99%" are never told); telephone interview with Dr. Grant Schmidt, Asst. Prof. Obs. & Gyn., Ohio
State Univ. (Jan. 29, 1985); Model Statute, supra note 16, Commentary to Statute at I ("Most children conceived by A.I.
are never told that they are, in effect, 'adopted.' ").
190. HRB 147, supra note 21, § 3111.031(C).
191. H1B 147, supra note 21, § 3111.031(D).
192. See infra Part IV.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
194. See Eisenman, supra note 1, at 389-90.
195. HB 147, supra note 21, § 3111.031(E).
196. Id.
197. As one author noted, "AI legislation may not be easy to enact because some members of the public are still
strongly opposed to Al." Shaman, supra note 17, at 351. Therefore, legislators must decide whether to introduce bills
that cover all bases, and face much opposition, or bills that protect donors, children, parents, and doctors in the most
common uses of AID, and face much less opposition. Telephone interview with Rep. Marie Tansey, Ohio Gen. Assem.
(Jan. 18, 1985).
198. HB 147, supra note 21.
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addressed at all by the UPA 199 or the OPA. 200 The following section reviews the need
for a comprehensive statute regulating donor insemination, and presents suggestions
for such a statute.
VI. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AID STATUTE-NECESSARY
PROVISIONS
Strong public policy reasons support the need in all fifty states for a statute
concerning artificial insemination by donor. The case law on this procedure is
confused and inconclusive, leading to a great deal of unpredictability in the law.20 1
Before the Gursky opinion declaring AID-conceived children illegitimate, 202 many
lawyers believed that an artificial insemination by donor statute was unnecessary,
since the rights and duties of the parties seemed obvious.20 3 No longer can this be
assumed. "The absence of laws has created a regulatory void in which no one is
protected.' '24 With the high level of uncertainty, "the present situation makes a
mockery of the 'welfare of the child' principle professed to be the governing maxim
of family law.' '205 Since the procedure is not uncommon, despite the risks, many
children are currently unprotected. 206 Artificial insemination by donor statutes, if well
written, would protect them.
One author argues that donor insemination should not be encouraged through
legislation until our society does studies on how AID-conceived children fare
psychologically and physically. 20 7 Since many children may never be told that they
were conceived through the use of donor insemination,208 studies may not be possible
for many years, if ever. In the meantime, the children currently are facing legal
dilemmas that may not be properly resolved if courts are unable to rely on modem
legislative guidelines.
The same author argues that genetic knowledge among practitioners in this field
seems inadequate. 20 9 Yet, studies have shown that the incidence of genetic defects is
lower in children conceived by artificial insemination by donor than those conceived
by natural means. 2 0 Provisions in donor insemination statutes can establish genetic
199. UPA, supra note 81.
200. OPA, supra note 18.
201. See supra notes 28-78 and accompanying text; see also Clapshaw, supra note 4, at 269.
202. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 44-49.
203. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973); Model Statute, supra note
16, Commentary to Statute at 1 ("The law, until the 1970's, contained a very strong presumption that any child conceived
or born in wedlock was the child of the husband.").
204. Jenkins, supra note 1, at 62.
205. Clapshaw, supra note 4, at 262.
206. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text. While in Columbus, Ohio the use of AID has decreased, supra
notes 167-68 and accompanying text, it is still occurring here to some degree.
207. Annas, supra note 13, at 6.
208. See supra note 189.
209. Annas, supra note 13, at 8.
210. Smith, supra note 137, at 40 (Smith relies on the work of Dr. J.K. Sherman, Prof. of Anatomy, Univ. of Ark.
for Med. Sciences, a leader in developing standards for human semen cyrobanking, or storage, for his statements that
studies show decreased incidences of birth defects in children conceived by artificial insemination as opposed to natural
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testing requirements that would ensure, as much as physically possible using present
technologies, against transmission of defects. One doctor believes, however, that the
present system is cheaper and just as successful as any system requiring set testing
would be.21 ' Whether a statute delineates requirements or not, the practice of artificial
insemination may actually lead to the development of fewer genetic problems in
children.
There are a variety of other medical and social reasons why artificial insemina-
tion by a donor is beneficial and frequently used. Couples generally use the procedure
for one or more of the following reasons: One of the spouses is infertile;212 the
spouses' Rh blood incompatibility may cause stillbirths;213 or genetic diseases may
otherwise be transmitted. 21 4 These are valid reasons for seeking an artificial means of
reproduction. Since people are utilizing reproductive technologies, legislatures should
promulgate laws to guide, define, and protect their actions.
A useful artificial insemination statute will protect donors, children, parents, and
doctors, while allowing all involved parties to retain as great a degree of privacy as
possible. Such a statute should begin with definitions of the parent-child relationship,
just as in the OPA, 21 5 and a definition of artificial insemination, 21 6 and should
establish that the parent-child relationship applies for all purposes, including support,
visitation, custody rights, and inheritance. It should state that the presumptions of
paternity, as provided in section 3111.03 in Ohio, 217 apply unless this procedure is
involved, in which case a provision similar to section 3111.031 of Ohio's HB 147218
will conclusively apply.
The statute should also offer the donor the right to consent to be the father of the
child. While this provision mainly protects single women who choose to be artificially
inseminated, it recognizes the fact that single women do choose to have children by
using this procedure, and that the donor should be allowed to claim the child as his
own, if both parties so desire. 219 The statute should clearly state that the donor has
no rights or duties to the child unless the parties agree otherwise.220
means); see also infra note 211, telephone interview with Dr. James Goldfarb, Repro. Endocrin., Cleveland, Ohio (Feb.
4, 1985).
211. Telephone interview with Dr. James Goldfarb, Repro. Endocrin., Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 4, 1985). Currently,
most doctors use medical students as donors; therefore, the donors, in general, are men who realize the importance of
certain family genetic details and know what information is crucial to the safety of their sperm. When the donor's history
reveals that a test is necessary (Tay-Sachs for Jewish people; sickle cell for black people), it is performed. This process
spares the expense of performing a series of expensive tests on every donor. Id.
212. See supra note 8; Wadlington, supra note 7, at 782; Shaman, supra note 17, at 331. Artificial insemination
provides an alternative to adoption for infertile couples facing a shortage of adoptable children. Knoppers, supra note 137,
at 108.
213. Shaman, supra note 17, at 332; Wadlington, supra note 7, at 782.
214. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 802.
215. See supra notes 123-27.
216. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 677.355 (see definition at supra note 2); Model Statute, supra note 16, § 1 (same
as definition in OR. REv. STAT. § 677.355).
217. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 180-84.
219. Model Statute, supra note 16, § 2(a); see also Comments to Statute at 2.
220. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(2) (West Supp. 1985) ("The donor. . . is not the natural father of a child
conceived, [and] bears no liability for the support of the child and has no parental rights with regard to the child.").
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In order to protect the privacy of the parties as well as to match the donor's
characteristics with the husband's, the statute should require the physician to provide
the woman, and her husband, if married, with genetic and family medical history, race,
age, hair and eye color, height and weight, and any other information that the donor
agrees to provide.221 The statute should require that information identifying the donor
be kept by the doctor who performs the insemination, or by the lab which collects the
sperm, for a limited period of time such as five years. 222 Thus, if any genetic defects
occurred, the donor could be traced. This information would be obtainable only upon
court order, and only if necessary in order to give a child medical treatment or remove
a donor with genetic disorders from a sperm donation list.223
Only licensed doctors should be allowed to perform artificial insemination by
donor, 224 and they should be required to test the sperm donor for general health, blood
type, Rh factor, and genetic history. 225 The doctor should be protected from civil
liability if he or she has informed the patients and donors of the risks involved in the
procedure. 226 These provisions would protect all of the affected parties, including the
donor and the properly prudent doctor. The AID-conceived child is more likely to be
in good health if some minimal health guidelines and tests are required, and parents
can rest assured that the likelihood of conceiving a healthy baby is high.227
VII. CONCLUSION
In order to demonstrate the need for all states to have statutes concerning
artificial insemination by donor, this Note has examined Ohio's current parentage
laws, the relevant cases and statutes in the United States, and a few of the problems
that can occur under Ohio's law. House Bill 147, a bill adding a provision regarding
this procedure in Ohio law, was analyzed to demonstrate what a skeletal statute can
offer. Widespread use of AID calls for a broader statute that offers more certainty than
current law. 228 It is hoped that this Note will inspire the Ohio General Assembly to
pass a statute containing many of the suggested provisions, and that other states will
look to Ohio's law as an example. "The time has come-in fact, is long overdue-
when legislatures must set standards for artificial insemination by donors, declare the
legitimacy of the children, and protect the liability of all directly involved with this
procedure.' 229
Judith Lynn Bick Rice
221. Model Statute, supra note 16, § 7.
222. Model Statute, supra note 16, § 7. According to the Interprofessional Commission on Education and Practice's
Policy Analysis Panel, the "need for such information most probably would arise with any urgency only during the fist
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